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Digestion and Moral Progress in Epictetus 
Michael Tremblay 
The Stoic Epictetus famously criticizes his students for studying Stoicism as ‘mere theory’ and encouraged 
them to add training to their educational program. This is made all the more interesting by the fact that 
Epictetus, as a Stoic, was committed to notion that wisdom is sufficient to be virtuous, so theory should be 
all that’s required to achieve virtue. How are we then to make sense of Epictetus criticism of an overreliance 
on theory, and his insistence on adding training? This paper argues that this tension can be resolved through 
an appeal to the metaphor of ‘digesting theory’. Epictetus discusses the digestion of theory in three parts of 
his existent work. While the use of digestion as a metaphor for moral progress in Epictetus has been noted, 
an explanation as to exactly what this process consists of has yet to be provided. This paper attempts to 
provide such an account. I argue that digestion consists of assimilating what we have learnt conceptually, 
at the level of general principles, into specific beliefs concerning existent objects. I argue further that this 
process of digestion can only be achieved through what Epictetus calls training (askesis).  
The following paper will examine the metaphor of digestion (pepsis) in the work of 
Epictetus.1 While the use of digestion as a metaphor for moral progress in Epictetus has been noted 
and in partially explored in recent literature2, an explanation as to exactly what this essential 
process consists of has yet to be provided. 
The aim of the paper is two-fold. First, it attempts to elucidate what exactly the process of 
digestion entails for Epictetus’ moral psychology, and second it will examine in what way 
digestion fits within his greater pedagogical system. The hope is that this explanation will lend 
credence to the claim, put forward by Sellars3, that Epictetus’ educational program is divided into 
1 A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2018 Philosofest at the University of Ottawa, as well 
as the 2019 meeting of the Hellenistic Philosophy Society at the Pacific APA. I am grateful for those present 
for the comments. Additionally I would like to thank Annie Larivée for her helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this paper.  
2 Sharpe (2012), Sellars (2007) 
3 2007. 
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two complimentary components: the instruction of rational principles (logoi) and training 
(askesis). 
 
Introduction 
 
 Pioneered by the influential work of Hadot4, there has been a resurgence of interest in 
examining whether ancient philosophy should be understood as a more than a system of theories, 
but also as a way of life. It is becoming increasingly popular to view ancient philosophy as an art 
or craft (techne) that was not just studied, but also practiced.5 When searching for ancient 
illustrations of those who conceived of philosophy as a craft, the Stoic Epictetus serves as an often 
referenced example. He was a teacher who demanded his students not just study philosophy, but 
to embody it, and to demonstrate the progress they have made through their actions.6 He also 
criticized those who turned to Sophistry or teaching without having learnt to live by what they 
teach.7  
 While it is clear that Epictetus demanded his students live as Stoics, and reflect this in their 
actions, it remains controversial as to how they were best to go about doing so. As such, once again 
inspired by the work of Hadot, focus has turned to the educational program of Epictetus. Roughly 
speaking, interest in this aspect of Epictetus often concerns the following question: 
(1) Did Epictetus believe training in ‘spiritual exercises’ were required to achieve moral progress, or did he 
believe the study of theory alone to be sufficient?8 
 For those that believe training is necessary for Epictetus, there are two additional questions: 
                                                 
4 Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault. Trans. Arnold I. Davidson. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1995; The Inner Citadel: the “Meditations” of Marcus Aurelius. Trans. Michael 
Chase. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
5 Cf. M. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1994; Sellars (2004); J. M. Cooper Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in 
Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus. Princeton University Press, 2012. 
6 Disc. I 4 5-13  
7 Disc. III 21.  
8 Cf. Cooper (2007) argues that rational argument is sufficient for moral improvement in Epictetus, where-
as Sellars (2007) and Sharpe (2012) argue that training, in conjunction with theory, is necessary. 
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(2) What is the function of training for Epictetus?9 
(3) How can the necessity of this training possibly fit within Epictetus’ psychology, when the Stoics are 
committed a wholly rational self?10  
 This paper will primarily address the second question by exploring the metaphor of 
digestion. Digestion, this paper will argue, is one of the primary goals of training in Epictetus. It 
will bracket the first question, taking it to be true, for reasons to be discussed shortly, that the 
educational program of Epictetus requires both theory and training. The third question, while 
interesting and worthy of development, falls outside the scope of this paper. The hope is that 
through focusing on the function of training in Epictetus, this paper will both provide new insight 
into the pedagogical system of Epictetus, as well as provide evidence for those still undecided that 
training is in fact a necessary component of philosophy for Epictetus. However, before the function 
of training can be discussed properly, we must begin with a foundational understanding of theory 
and training in Epictetus.  
 
Theory and Training 
 
 In his paper Stoic Practical Philosophy in the Imperial Period (2007), Sellars argues that 
there is a tradition, beginning with Socrates, to view perfecting any craft (tekhne) as requiring both 
theory (logos) and training (askesis).11 The apprentice craftsman must understand how to make a 
shoe, as well as the final ends of shoe-making, but these alone are insufficient without also 
developing the technical skill-set required to put this theory into practice. Sellars argues that this 
conception of tekhne is present in Epictetus, who views philosophy as a way of life, or an art to be 
                                                 
9 Cf. Hadot (1998,  82-98), Braicovich (2012) for major discussions, also Sellars (2007, 135-8) and Sharpe 
(2012, 380-5). 
10 The reason this question is substantial is that it seems if rational discourse and the studying of philosophy 
are not sufficient for moral progress, then the intellectualism of Epictetus is undermined. One would assume 
that a wholly rational self would not need to be trained like the irrational part of the soul found in Plato. 
This problem is noted by Brennan (2003, 278-9) and Johnson (2014, Page 83, Footnote 30). Braicovitch 
(2012) attempts to show that at least one exercise, repetition, can be coherent with Epictetus’ philosophy if 
we understand its role properly. 
11 It is important to note that while Sellars admits his indebtedness to Hadot’s work on spiritual exercises 
in Ancient philosophy, this conception differs from that of Hadot. Hadot views Ancient philosophy as a 
spiritual exercise, where-as Sellars is proposing that exercises from one part of a two-part program, of 
which theory makes up the other half (Sellars, 2007, ft. 2)  
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practiced. This should not be too surprising, given Epictetus’ well-referenced idealization of 
Socrates.12 
 If Sellars is correct, then there exists a division in the philosophy of Epictetus, between the 
study of theory and training. Both are necessary to perfect the craft of living well, and neither is 
sufficient on its own. When we examine the Discourses, there seems to be strong textual evidence 
for such an interpretation.13 Additionally, it becomes apparent that there is a specific order with 
which these two parts must be engaged. In order to live well we begin with theory, for, due to its 
abstracted nature, it is easier to master first and provides a proper foundation for the more difficult 
training: 
The philosophers, therefore, first exercise us in theory, which is the easier task, and then lead us to the more 
difficult: for in theory there is nothing to oppose our following what we are taught; but in life there are 
many things to distract us.14  
        However theory alone is insufficient to live well, because living well extends beyond the 
domain of theory,15 thus we complement our theory with training: 
For this reason philosophers exhort us not to be contented with mere learning, but to add practice also, and 
then training.16  
        Theory and training rely upon each other then. When studying theory, we learn the 
principles and precepts of Epictetus’ brand of Stoicism. This would include, among other things, 
instruction in the nature of virtue, the divinity of the universe, and what is in our control and what 
is not.17 However, Epictetus criticized those who focused exclusively on theory, and ignored its 
implementation and practice.18 Theory is inert and valueless unless we practice and train through 
exercises. Thus Sellars concludes that “the purpose of these exercises is to enable one to express 
                                                 
12 Cf. Long 2002, 67-96 for a good overview of how Epictetus’ philosophy is heavily influenced by the 
figure of Socrates. 
13 Cf. III 23 1-3 in which Epictetus discusses how a craftsman or athlete is useless without both the skill to 
implement the task, and the knowledge of what their task is.                                                                                                                     
14 I 26 3 trans. Hard. 
15 “For is not reading a kind of preparation for living, but living itself made up of things other than books?” 
Disc. IV 4 11. 
16 II 9 13 trans. Hard 
17 Cf. I 1.  
18 Cf. I 4 6-17. 
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one’s philosophical principles in one’s actions, thereby transforming one’s way of life”.19 By no 
means does this understanding of Epictetus imply that he did not conceive of rational instruction 
as essential for living well.20 Theory is the necessary first part in a two-part process. Nonetheless, 
the value of theory cannot be actualized unless we train ourselves.  
 So if the purpose of training is to allow the individual to embody and live by their lessons, 
what is its function on a psychological level? How does it achieve this purpose? Epictetus is 
notoriously committed to a Socratic intellectualism, in which he holds that we must assent to that 
which seems true.21 It seems strange then, given this understanding of our psychology, that 
Epictetus does not believe we could achieve proper behavior through coming to understand the 
logical necessity of Stoic philosophical doctrine. The most important question then is, for someone 
committed to Socratic intellectualism like Epictetus, what does training do that the studying of 
theory could not? The remainder of this paper shall argue that what training does is allow for the 
digestion of theory.  
 When discussing the function of training, both Sellars22 and Sharpe23 note the metaphor of 
digestion (pepsis) as the one utilized by Epictetus to account for the function of training. However, 
in-depth explanations as to what digestion entails are not provided. Sharpe provides no explanation 
as to what is meant by digestion. Sellars claims that for Epictetus, to digest theory is “to absorb 
one’s philosophical ideas into one’s character”24. This is a helpful starting point, but such an 
account leaves much room for an improved understanding of the function of digestion. My aim is 
to provide such an account.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 2007, 132.  
20 Cf. Cooper (2007) for a good explanation of why theory is necessary for moral improvement for 
Epictetus, despite Epictetus’ tendency to criticize those who focus too heavily upon study. 
21 Cf. I 28 1-5; 3 3 2-4. Also Long (2002, 98-100). Long refers to this as Epictetus’ “optimistic rationalism”.  
22 2007, 132.  
23 2012, 379. 
24 2007, 133. 
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Textual Evidence  
 
 Epictetus refers to the phenomenon of digestion (pepsis) three times within the Discourses 
and Enchiridion.25 In addition to this, there is one further passage in which he discusses the 
interrelated phenomenon of vomiting (emesis).26 Reference to digestion first appears in Book 2 
Chapter 9 of the Discourses. It is introduced as an explanation for why students are able to act in 
opposition to the Stoic theory they know so well. Epictetus explains that each student present 
before him is able to provide a systematic discourse on the nature of good and evil. Yet, if someone 
was to laugh at them during this, they would each become flustered, despite their just explaining 
that this laughter would qualify as indifferent.27 The reason for this bizarre disparity between talk 
and action, Epictetus explains, is a lack of digestion: 
It is one thing to hoard up bread and wine in a store-cupboard, and another to eat it. What is eaten is digested, 
distributed and becomes nerves, flesh, bones, blood, a fine complexion, ease of breathing. Whatever is 
hoarded up is ready, indeed, whenever you have a mind to show it; but no further use to you than the mere 
reputation that you have for possessing it.28  
ἄλλο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς εἰς ταμιεῖον ἀποθέσθαι ἄρτους καὶ οἶνον, ἄλλο ἐστὶ φαγεῖν. τὸ βρωθὲν ἐπέφθη, ἀνεδόθη, 
νεῦρα ἐγένετο, σάρκες, ὀστέα, αἷμα, εὔχροια, εὔπνοια. τὰ ἀποκείμενα ὅταν μὲν θελήσῃς ἐκ προχείρου 
λαβὼν δεῖξαι δύνασαι, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν δέ σοι ὄφελος οὐδὲν εἰ μὴ μέχρι τοῦ δοκεῖν ὅτι ἔχεις. 
Epictetus goes on to explain that those who have not digested their theory are like early 
Christians who have been baptized, but do not change their way of living. They take on title of 
philosopher in name only. These kinds of students pride themselves in knowing the philosophical 
principles of Stoicism, but do not act in accordance with them.  
In this first passage, we see that digestion is the bridge or connection between studying 
theory, and being able to act in accordance with that theory. In other words, digestion allows one 
to progress from understanding the nature good, evil and indifferent objects, to living in line with 
that understanding. Philosophical principles are not manifested in our actions until they have been 
digested. Digestion then, seems a necessary process to actualize the value of studied theory. 
Theory, like stored food, is morally inert and valueless without being digested. Its sole ‘value’, 
                                                 
25 Disc. II 9 13-22; III 21 1-6; Ench. 46. 
26 Disc. I 26 15-18.  
27 Disc. I 9 15-17. 
28 Disc, II 9 18 trans. Hard. 
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pre-digestion, is the reputation it confers, something Epictetus would not consider to actually be a 
good at all.29 This same idea, that digestion is the connection between theory and proper action, is 
emphasized again in a later passage: 
Those who have learned precepts (θεωρήματα) as mere theory want to vomit them up immediately, just as 
people with weak stomachs do with their food. Digest your precepts first, and you will not vomit them up 
in this way; otherwise they really do turn to vomit, tainted matter unfit to eat. Then show us some change 
that results from those precepts in your own ruling faculty…30 
ὅτι τὰ θεωρήματα ἀναλαβόντες ψιλὰ εὐθὺς αὐτὰ ἐξεμέσαι θέλουσιν ὡς οἱ στομαχικοὶ τὴν τροφήν. πρῶτον 
αὐτὸ πέψον, εἶθ᾽ οὕτω μὴ ἐξεμέσῃς: εἰ δὲ μή, ἔμετος τῷ ὄντι γίνεται, πρᾶγμ᾽ ἀκάθαρτον καὶ ἄβρωτον. ἀλλ᾽ 
ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀναδοθέντων δεῖξόν τινα ἡμῖν μεταβολὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τοῦ σεαυτοῦ… 
Once again, we see present the idea that it is digestion which allows philosophical 
principles (θεωρήματα) to change our actions. In this passage this is made clear through the 
reference to a transformation of our ruling faculty or hegemonikon. Such a transformation is, after 
all, the goal of studying philosophy and the means of achieving virtue for a Stoic. 
       Introduced in this passage as well is the accompanying concept of vomiting. Digestion does 
more than render theory valuable. It is also what ensures that theory is not vomited and rendered 
unfit for us. Keeping with the metaphor, Epictetus warns us again that if theory is not digested, 
you will vomit it up:  
So that if talk should arise amongst laymen on some philosophical principle (θεωρήματός), remain, for the 
most part, silent; for there is considerable danger that you will immediately vomit up what you have not yet 
digested. And when someone tells you that you know nothing and you are not nettled by it, then you may 
be sure that you are setting to work at your task. For sheep do not bring their fodder to the shepherds to 
show much they have eaten, but digest their food internally, and produce wool and milk externally. And so 
you likewise should not display your principles to laymen, but rather show them the actions that result from 
these principles once they have been digested.31  
κἂν περὶ θεωρήματός τινος ἐν ἰδιώταις ἐμπίπτῃ λόγος, σιώπα τὸ πολύ: μέγας γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος εὐθὺς 
ἐξεμέσαι, ὃ οὐκ ἔπεψας. καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ σοί τις, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶσθα, καὶ σὺ μὴ δηχθῇς, τότε ἴσθι, ὅτι ἄρχῃ τοῦ 
ἔργου. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ πρόβατα οὐ χόρτον φέροντα τοῖς ποιμέσιν ἐπιδεικνύει πόσον, ἔφαγεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν νομὴν 
ἔσω πέψαντα ἔρια ἔξω φέρει καὶ γάλα: καὶ σὺ τοίνυν μὴ τὰ θεωρήματα τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἐπιδείκνυε, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπ᾽ 
αὐτῶν πεφθέντων τὰ ἔργα. 
Epictetus holds that any philosophical principle not yet digested is at risk of being vomited 
by the individual. A picture of what vomiting exactly entails without a picture of what digestion 
                                                 
29 Cf. I 4 6-17. 
30 Disc. III 21 1-3 trans. Hard.  
31 Ench, 46 trans. Hard. 
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consists of is difficult to provide, but there are four things we can know about it at this point. First, 
is that it cannot coincide with digestion. Something that is vomited is not digested. Second, there 
is a performative or social aspect to vomiting. In the above passage Epictetus warns about 
discussing philosophy with others, for we risk vomiting up our principles. Additionally, when a 
student who does not live in accordance with Stoicism offers to read Epictetus his commentaries, 
Epictetus responds “Away with you! Look for someone else to vomit over”.32 In this way, vomiting 
seems to be something we do with, or towards, other people.  
Third, there is a personally harmful aspect to vomiting. This is emphasized in the following 
passage: 
The first step, therefore, towards becoming a philosopher is to become aware of the true state of one’s ruling 
faculty; for, when a person knows it to be in a weak state, he will not immediately employ it in great matters. 
But as it is, some, who can scarcely swallow a morsel, buy, and set themselves to eat, whole treatises; with 
the result that they vomit them up again, or suffer indigestion; and then come colics, fluxes and fevers. Such 
persons ought to consider what they can take.33 
αὕτη οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν, αἴσθησις τοῦ ἰδίου ἡγεμονικοῦ πῶς ἔχει: μετὰ γὰρ τὸ γνῶναι ὅτι ἀσθενῶς 
οὐκ ἔτι θελήσει χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα. νῦν δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοί τινες τὸν ψωμὸν καταπίνειν σύνταξιν 
ἀγοράσαντες ἐπιβάλλονται ἐσθίειν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐμοῦσιν ἢ ἀπεπτοῦσιν: εἶτα στρόφοι καὶ κατάρροιαι καὶ 
πυρετοί. ἔδει δ᾽ ἐφιστάνειν, εἰ δύνανται. 
Staying faithful to his metaphor, Epictetus draws a connection between vomiting, 
indigestion and other physical ailments such as a fever. Thus not only do other not want to vomited 
upon, but the individual becomes sick themselves when they engage in this process. Finally, as 
evident from the above passage, vomiting, or a lack of digestion is associated with a lack of self-
awareness, and an application of ourselves beyond our current level of progress.  
Before we moved on to an account of what digestion entails, there are two additional points 
to be gained from the textual evidence. First, we have evidence that digestion entails something 
beyond theory. Epictetus warns that precepts learned as ‘mere theory’ shall be vomited and not 
properly digested.34 Digestion is prevented then when we limit our education exclusively to the 
study of theory. Thus, to ensure digestion we must add something above and beyond theory, but 
Epictetus does not explain in this passage what that additional factor could be. Returning to Book 
                                                 
32 Disc. III 21 6 trans. Hard. 
33 Disc. I 26 15-17 trans. Hard. 
34 Disc. III 21 1. 
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2, Chapter 9, we get our answer: digestion requires training. Just before Epictetus first mention of 
digestion, we are told that only proper acts of a virtuous nature can overcome the corrupting effects 
of vicious habits. And “for this reason philosophers exhort us not to be contented with mere 
learning, but to add practice also, and then training”.35 This is strong evidence that there is an 
important link between training and the digestion of theory.  
A final point about digestion to consider: the second quoted passage is taken from the 
beginning of a chapter titled: “To those who set out to become lectures” (πρὸς τοὺς εὐκόλως ἐπὶ 
τὸ σοφιστεύειν ἐρχομένους). The chapter scolds those who focus on theory alone, and do not digest 
stoic precepts. As such, one major difference, if not perhaps the greatest difference in Epictetus’ 
view, between a mere lecturer and a philosopher is that the lecturer neglects training, and focusing 
exclusively on theory. And if the connection between training and digestion I proposed is correct, 
then only philosophers actually practice digestion while lectures do not. 
 We are fortunate to have these passages, which provide information about digestion, its 
results, and the implications of neglecting it. Unfortunately for us, Epictetus does not provide an 
explicit account of the exact psychological function of digestion. We know that to have digested 
theory means the individual may act in accordance with it, but he does not tell us how digestion 
allows the individual to act in accordance with theory, or why digested precepts will not be vomited 
or rendered unfit for us. The next section will provide such an account. From these above passages 
we have learnt at least five features of digestion that any successful account must explain: 
(1) The studying of theory is not sufficient for digestion to occur.   
(2) Digestion concerns philosophical principles (θεωρήματα). 
(3) Digestion stops the ‘vomiting’ of philosophical principles. 
(4) Digestion allows philosophical principles to actualize their moral worth.  
(5) A proper philosopher practices digestion, where-as those who set out to become lectures do not.  
 These features shall be our guide as we construct an account of the exact function and 
nature of digestion in Epictetus. 
 
 
                                                 
35 Disc. II.9.13. 
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Pedagogical Function of Digestion 
The Three Topoi  
 
 Epictetus is unique amongst the few Stoics of which major writings remain, in that he was 
first and foremost a teacher. Unlike Chrysippus or Zeno before him, he was not primarily 
concerned with laying down a systematic explanation of the world. Unlike Marcus Aurelius, his 
Stoicism was not a personal means to help himself. Rather, Epictetus was committed to using 
Stoicism to transform the lives of his students. This is reflected in the form and function of the 
work of his which is preserved. 
  Our largest source of his work, the Discourses, is written by his prominent student, Arrian. 
The Discourses record and reconstruct informal lessons and conversations between Epictetus and 
his students, which were primarily young men from successful families who looked to Epictetus 
to prepare them for the complicated realities of business and political life at the time. Our other 
major source, the Encindrion or Handbook, also attributed to Arrian, distills these already informal 
lessons into an even simpler form. As the name Handbook implies, it would have been small 
enough to carry around during daily activities. This was so the central themes of Epictetus’ 
teachings may be easily referred to and accessed at all times by students wishing to actualize their 
training outside of the classroom. 
 Central to the philosophy of Epictetus is a pedagogical approach. Thus the most effective 
method to understanding digestion is to try and place where it could fit within his pedagogical 
system. Epictetus divides education into a three parts. There are three areas of training, or topoi, 
one must master in order to act properly36: 
(1) Training oneself concerning desires and aversions. 
(2) Training oneself concerning impulses. 
(3) Training oneself concerning judgement and assent. 
 These areas must be practiced in the order listed as they build upon one another. For 
Epictetus, we may not effectively advance onto the next stages until we have mastered the previous 
one.37  
                                                 
36 Disc. III 2; I 17 22-4; 21 2; II 17 15-17 and 31-33; III 12 13-14; 26 14; cf. Cooper 2007, 15-19; Hadot 
1998, 82-98; Long 2002, 112-118; Sharpe 2012, 381-383. 
37 Disc. II 17 10-17. 
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 It would be useful to examine these stages in greater detail. The first area concerns “desires 
and aversions, with the object of ensuring that a person does not fail in his desires or have 
experiences he does not want”.38 So one’s educational program properly begins with evaluating 
the value we place on external objects. By deeming them as either good or bad, we place value 
upon the wrong kinds of things: money, pretty women, social status etc.39 It is wrong to value these 
because they are external to us, and we are thus liable to suffer when our desires are frustrated. It 
is only when a person does not make these value judgements about external objects that one may 
never fail in his or her desires, and never suffer experiences they do not wish for themselves.40 
This area of study was famously associated with physics by Hadot, because it entails coming to 
gain a proper understanding of what the world is.41 We are not then training ourselves to avoid 
attachment to external objects because they are painful to desire. Rather, they are painful to desire 
because they are not the proper objects of desire. Epictetus is compelling us to first, before anything 
else, gain a true understanding of the nature of the world, as it relates to our desires and aversions.  
 Once we have successfully refrained from desiring or fearing externals, then we may move 
towards the second area of study, concerning proper impulses, or how to successfully respect 
natural and acquired duties and obligations to others. The student should wish to be free from 
passion and perturbation, but they should also desire to know how to act properly in their lives. 
For as Epictetus says, “I should not be unfeeling like a statue, but should preserve my natural and 
acquired relations as a man who honors the gods, as a son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen”.42 
It is not sufficient for the virtuous individual to be totally reclusive and introspective. We must 
still, as social animals that possess divine reason, respect the impulses that are natural and proper 
to us.  
       The progression here is apparent. If we do not master the first area of study, concerning 
desires and aversions, we will fail in the second, for these desires make us suffer from passions 
                                                 
38 Disc. III 2 1, trans. Long 2002, 112 
39 Disc. III 2 8-9. 
40 Disc. III 2 3. 
41 1998, 91-93. 
42 Disc. III 2 4, trans. Hard; cf. II 17 31. 
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and thus cause us to be unresponsive to reason.43 Only once we are free from passion may we use 
reason to determine which impulses are natural and thus permissible to follow.  
       At this point we are finally ready for the third area of study, concerning judgement. This 
area “falls to those who are already making progress and is concerned with the achievement of 
certainty in the matters already covered, so that even in dreams, or drunkenness, or melancholy no 
untested impression may catch us off guard.”44 Here Epictetus is in line with the orthodox view of 
the Stoic Sage as infallible, regardless of circumstances. At this stage, nothing new is introduced. 
The student is tasked instead with ensuring that they do not lose what they have already gained. 
This would be achieved by means of a thorough mastery of logic.45 
Having given a brief overview of the three areas of study in Epictetus, the question is now 
where digestion should be understood to fit into this system. As noted above, digestion concerns 
principles or θεωρήματα. In Epictetus view, this is the domain of the first topoi. Enchridion 52 
tells us that “The first and most necessary area of philosophy is the one that deals with the 
application of principles (θεωρήματα)”. Thus there is a clear association between θεώρημα and 
the first area of study. With this in mind, I will provide a position account of what I take the 
pedagogical function of digestion to be in Epictetus’ educational program. 
 
Application of Preconceptions to Particulars 
 
 Having concluded that digestion concerns the first area of study, let us examine it in greater 
detail. For Epictetus, the greatest problem facing those who wish to being practicing philosophy 
is the mistaken beliefs they have accumulated over their life time. It is for this reason that he states: 
“What is the first business of one who pursues philosophy? To cast away self-conceit”.46 As adults, 
we cannot begin to study philosophy as blank slates. We carry with us a slew of misunderstandings 
about the world, accumulated through unique experiences, which impede our progress. It is these 
false judgements about the benefit or harm of externals that cause our passionate desires and 
aversions 
                                                 
43 Disc. III 2 3. 
44 Disc. III 2 5 trans. Hard. 
45 Cf. Long 2002, 117. 
46 Disc. II 17 1 trans. Hard. 
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       If these misunderstandings were purely subjective and individualistic it would be difficult, 
perhaps even impossible, to convince individuals of the truth. However, an essential aspect to 
Epictetus’ educational program is his belief that as rational beings we also possess universally 
shared, and correct, preconceptions. The cause of our misunderstandings, and the suffering that 
arises from them, is the misapplication of true preconceptions47: 
This is the cause of everyone’s troubles, the inability to apply common preconceptions to particulars. 
Instead the opinions of men as to what is bad diverge. One thinks that he is unwell, when it’s nothing of the 
kind; the problem is that he is not adapting preconceptions correctly. One imagines that he is poor, another 
that he has a difficult mother or father, still another that Caesar is not disposed in his favour. This is all 
caused by one and the same thing, namely, ignorance of how to apply one’s preconceptions. 
Who, after all, does not have a preconception of ‘bad’, to the effect that it is harmful, that it should be 
avoided, and that we should use every means to get rid of it? One preconception does not conflict with 
another, conflict arises when it comes to their application. What is this ‘bad’, then, which is also harmful 
and needs to be avoided? One says it’s not being Caesar’s friend: he’s off the mark, he’s not applying 
preconceptions properly…48  
        We see from this passage that Epictetus holds preconceptions to be common. Everyone 
grasps what it means for something to be harmful or bad for them. This understanding manifests 
itself motivationally. For the Stoics, recognition of value compels an impulse from the agent. So 
Epictetus defines these preconceptions in terms of how they will make us act. For something to be 
harmful means that ‘it should be avoided’ and that we should aim ‘to get rid of it’. Humans differ 
not in their preconceptions, but in how they apply these preconceptions to particular things. Our 
false beliefs are categorization mistakes. One categorizes something that is indifferent, such as 
‘not being Caesar’s friend’, as harmful. This mistake in application then leads to an inability to 
control desires and aversions because we have placed value in an object of which we have no 
control.  
      By evoking preconceptions, Epictetus is following his Stoic predecessors. Preconceptions 
existed as a part of orthodox Stoic psychology. Preconceptions are developed through a natural 
tendency of the individual, qua rational agent, to assent to certain things are being true.49 In Early 
                                                 
47 Cf. Disc. I 2 1-6; II 17. 
48Disc. IV I 41-45 trans. Dobbin 
49 Cic. Acad. 2 30, Aetius 4 II 1-4 (SVF 2 83). 
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Stoicism the individual would possess preconceptions of a variety of concepts, not just moral 
terms, some of which would be universal, some of which not.50  
The major difference between Epictetus and his predecessors is that Epictetus focuses 
almost exclusively on moral preconceptions, which he believes to be universal without exception: 
‘Good’, ‘bad’, ‘useful’, ‘harmful’ – these words are part of everyone’s vocabulary, we all have a 
preconception of what they signify. But is it developed and complete? Prove it – apply it correctly to 
particular things. Now Plato, for his part, associates definitions with his preconception of what is ‘useful’; 
you, however, categorize them as useless. Both of you cannot be right…. But why refer to conflict between 
different people, and bring up that? Just take yourself – if you are good at applying your preconceptions, 
why are you internally conflicted and confused? We will ignore for now the second field of study, to do 
with impulse and the art of applying impulse to appropriate acts. Let’s skip the third field too, concerning 
assent – I’ll give you a pass on both. Let’s stay with the first; it furnishes almost tangible proof that you are 
not good at applying preconceptions. If your present desires are realistic – realistic for you personally – 
why are you frustrated and unhappy?51 
      Epictetus is explicit that proper application of preconceptions is how to master the first area 
of study. We suffer from desires and aversions because we are poor at applying preconceptions to 
particular situations. It is also worth noting that the individual may not even be internally consistent 
with their application of preconceptions. It is unsurprising that what the layman student considers 
‘useful’ differs with that of Plato, but that student also suffers from internal confusion, applying 
the same preconception to conflicting objects.  
       Up to this point we have seen that in order to master the first area of study, the individual 
must become adept at properly applying their preconceptions to particular situations. Given 
Epictetus’ understanding of preconceptions as universal and true, it is clear now that the principles 
studied by students of Epictetus would not teach or alter their preconceptions. The principles would 
only help them to understand how to properly apply that preconception. Take the following 
examples: 
Preconception = I should pursue what is good. 
                                                 
50 There is a controversy as to whether or not a preconception must be shared amongst men. For a good 
summary see Sandbach, 1971, 23-25, who argues that not all preconceptions are universally possessed. 
However even Sandbach agrees that Epictetus, contra to orthodox Stoicism, reserves the term 
preconceptions for specific moral terms (good, bad, the beautiful etc.), and describes them as being 
universally shared.  
51 Disc. II 2 10-17 trans Dobbin. 
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Θεώρημα = Virtue is the only good.52  
 But preconceptions and philosophical principles alone do not yet get us to proper 
application. There is an additional step. There is a logical inference utilizing that θεώρημα which 
allows us to properly categorize a specific object. In other words, believing that virtue is the only 
good does not immediately cause the individual to pursue only virtue. The individual must first 
examine the particular object, consider the definition of virtue, and successfully categorize the 
object as being an example of virtue, or not.  
 Epictetus explains this in the following passage. In this example, we mistakenly apply the 
preconception of god, that which ‘has the capacity to confer most benefit’, to politicians such as 
Caesar: “As a result we even honour them as gods, because we associate godhead with whatever 
has the capacity to confer most benefit. Then we posit a false minor premise: this man has the 
power to confer the most benefit. And the conclusion that follows from these premises is 
necessarily false as well”.53 
       The mistake here, as Epictetus makes clear, is not a lack of knowledge of philosophical 
principles as we might of assume, but rather a false the minor premise that Caesar has ‘the power 
to confer most benefit’. The individual has failed to properly categorize and define the particular 
object ‘Caesar’. In its most simple form, this mistake can be logically recreated as the following: 
P1: I should honor as a god only that which confers the most benefit. (Preconception) 
P2: Caesar has the power to confer the most benefit. (False premise) 
C: I should honor Caesar as a god. (False conclusion) 
     They are a variety of reasons one might posit the false premise. It could be because the 
proper principle for this situation is not present because it has not been learnt yet, or it may be that 
the principle was not recalled or applied properly. To avoid this mistake, the individual must both 
possess the necessary principle and successfully apply the principle to the particular situation: 
P1: I should honor as a god only that which confers the most good. (Preconception) 
P2: Only reason has the power to confer the most benefit. (θεώρημα) 
P3: Caesar is not reason. (Application of the precept to the particular situation) 
C1: Caesar does not have the power to confer the most benefit.  
C2: I should not honor Caesar as a good.  
                                                 
52 Cf. Disc. 2 9 15 
53 Epic. Disc. IV I 61 trans Dobbin. 
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       In the final example both P2 and P3 are necessary to arrive upon the correct conclusions. 
It should be evident now why Epictetus needs his students to study theory. Theory provides P2. 
Theory teaches students the philosophical which tell them how to properly apply their 
preconceptions in particular situations. But theory alone does not necessarily make the student 
aware of P3. The student must also take care to successfully apply the principle to the particular 
situation. Epictetus understood this well. This is part of the reason why Epictetus is so famously 
quick to criticize those who have a mastery of theory alone.54 One’s knowledge of all the 
philosophical principles is useless if one does not use them to inform their beliefs about the 
particular situations they encounter. Such a student will be constantly internally conflicted. They 
will have memorized the works of Chrysippus but still fear of the judgement of others. 
 What a student requires then is some way to ensure that principles learnt in the classroom 
are successfully recalled and applied in the appropriate situations. But this cannot be the domain 
of theory, because theory takes the form of general principles. What are needed are strategies for 
learning concerned with particular situations. The student needs ways to help ensure he or she 
correctly applies their theory to specific contexts, and makes the correct categorizations. For 
Epictetus, we gain this skill through training. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
the training exercises of Epictetus in detail, in recent work both Sellars (2007) and Braicovich 
(2012) discuss repetition as a necessary training exercise in the work of Epictetus. At multiple 
places in the Discourses, Epictetus demands that we train ourselves to constantly repeat and recall 
precepts situations in order to ensure that they are constantly mentally present and ready to be 
applied.55 As Sellars acknowledges,56 this two part focus on both theory and training was probably 
well known to Arrian as a student of Epictetus, who would have sought to reproduce it in his 
writings. The Discourses compliments theory, and contains philosophical principles and their 
detailed explanations. Where-as the Enchiridion compliments training, and is a list of simplified 
principles, which may be easily accessed when facing particular situations. Without both theory 
and training, the student would be unable to master desires and aversions, and could not progress 
to the second area of study.  
                                                 
54 Cf. Disc. I 4 6-17. 
55 Cf. Disc. I 1 21-25; II 1 29-30; III 24 101-3, 115. 
56 2007, 136 
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Digestion and Vomiting 
 
      Finally we are ready to return to digestion. Given what has been discussed, it seems 
apparent that digestion is a metaphor for the process of transitioning from having merely learnt a 
principle as theory, to having successfully applied that principle in particular situations, such that 
one has formed beliefs about particular objects in accordance with that principle. So for example, 
when I do not value Caesar’s opinion of me because I have made reference to my principles, I am 
beginning to digest those principles. I am beginning to render them valuable to me, they are 
beginning to change my ruling-faculty, and they will be manifested in my actions. 
To have fully digested a principle then is to have removed internal contradiction and to 
have all the beliefs about specific objects in one’s life be in accordance with that principle. The 
pedagogical function of digestion is that it allows us to master the first area of study. The way to 
master the first area of study, concerning desires and aversions, is to accumulate principles about 
the value of objects and then digest them. The student who has successfully done so will be ready 
to transition to the second area of study, for all of their beliefs concerning what is to be desired 
and avoided shall be correct.  
But such a process of digestion does not occur naturally. It requires intentional training. 
We must be vigilant of the impressions we are assenting to, we must repeat principles to ourselves 
constantly and keep them accessible to us, and we must seek situations to test our level of progress. 
Thus digestion cannot be achieved by studying things as ‘mere theory’. This sentiment is 
summarized well in the follow passage:  
…Neither in wrestling, nor writing, nor reading, am I contended with mere learning: but whatever 
arguments are presented to me I twist in every direction, and I construct new arguments, and do likewise 
with arguments based on equivocal premises. But the necessary principles (θεώρημ), but which I might 
escape from fear, grief, passion and hindrance, and be free, these I neither exercise (γυμνάζω) myself in nor 
devote the appropriate care to.57 
       Epictetus says that we need to exercise ourselves in our principles. And if my reading of 
digestion is correct, then the reason this exercise is necessary should be clear. It is necessary to 
facilitate digestion.  
                                                 
57 Disc. 4 6 15-16 trans. Hard. 
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 Vomiting and indigestion also play a significant role in Epictetus’ account. It is beyond the 
realm of this paper to explore the concept in great detail, but I will attempt an interpretation given 
my account of digestion. Vomiting, in so far as we vomit our principles onto other people can be 
understood as espousing and advocating for principles we have not digested, and thus do not fully 
endorse. In other words, it is being a hypocrite, and not living in accordance with our principles. 
For example, attesting to Stoic theory to others, while simultaneously being nervous of what they 
think of us. This vomit is tainted matter unfit to eat because it demonstrates a shallow 
understanding of Stoicism. It does not benefit others, and it is a perversion of what may have been 
rendered useful to ourselves if it had been digested instead.  
 Indigestion, and the other problems that come from it, can be understood as the personal 
harm that comes from a lack of digestion. When we engage with the world with contradictory 
beliefs, we will experience conflict and confusion. The solution to both vomiting and indigestion 
then is to have our beliefs come into accordance with our principles, or in other words, digesting 
them. And this is achieved through training ourselves in our principles beyond the mere study of 
theory, and through being cautious to not take on more than our current level of progress allows.58 
      Let us return to the five features of digestion listed previously, and examine how this account 
can explain them:  
(1) The studying of theory is not sufficient for digestion to occur.   
As discussed above, theory is necessary to apply a principle to a specific situation, because it provides us 
with the principles, but it is not sufficient because it is too general to ensure successful application to a 
particular case with unique nuances. The individual may fail to recall the principle, or even if they do, they 
may make an incorrect inference, or fail to categorize an object properly. Thus the student must add training 
to their education, in the form of at least repetition and other exercises, in order to ensure that precepts are 
properly applied.  
(2) Digestion concerns philosophical principles (θεωρήματα). 
This account of digestion centers around philosophical principles, and locates itself within the first topoi, 
which is the area of study concerned with principles. 
(3) Digestion stops the ‘vomiting’ of philosophical principles 
We vomit principles and suffer indigestion when our particular beliefs do not align with the principles we 
assent to and recommend others to follow. This is to be cured then by having all of our beliefs align with 
our principles. When this is achieved we will no longer vomit nor suffer indigestion. 
(4) Digestion allows philosophical principles to actualize their moral worth.  
While philosophical principles are a necessary part of becoming virtuous, they are morally inert and without 
value unless one’s understanding of them is reflected in his or her commanding faculty.59 Epictetus is not 
                                                 
58 Disc. 1 26 15-17. 
59 Cf. III 21 1-3. 
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concerned with our ability to list what is to be desired and avoided. He is concerned with if we, in actuality, 
fail to achieve our desires or experience what we would rather avoid.60 By digesting principles, the student 
acquires correct beliefs about particular objects in the world, and this allows them to progress in terms of 
their actual desires and aversions.  
(5) A proper philosopher practices digestion, where-as one who sets out to become a lecturer does not.  
The lecturer, by neglecting training and thus digestion, has memorized principles but cannot properly apply 
them to particular situations in their own lives. The lecturer may be able to cite Chrysippus and discuss 
aspects of virtue on a conceptual level, but they have neglected cultivating moral progress within 
themselves. In other words, the lecturer is concerned with theory alone and does not adopt philosophy as a 
way of life. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This paper has provided an interpretation of the metaphor of digestion in Epictetus. It has 
argued that digestion refers to the process by which students’ beliefs about particular situations 
and objects become, through training, in accordance with the principles they have learnt as theory. 
It has argued that digestion fits within Epictetus pedagogy as a necessary component of his first 
area of study, that of mastering desires and aversions. As such, digestion is a necessary component 
of his overall educational program, and required to achieve virtue.  
 As a secondary goal, this paper hopes to have provided evidence that Epictetus did not 
believe digestion could be achieved through the study of theory alone. Rather, it seems a reason 
for introducing the metaphor at all was to call attention to how theory is insufficient for moral 
progress without training.  It is my hope that a better understanding of the metaphor of digestion 
can help us to understand both that training was a necessary part of moral progress for Epictetus, 
and why training was necessary.  
 
 
Michael Tremblay 
Queen’s University, Ontario 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Cf. III 2 1. 
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